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Abstract
A borrower may hesitate to borrow from her close relatives and family members as it costs them in terms of
reduction in social insurance in the case of default. This invisible cost reduces credit risk. India’s household
indebtedness survey shows some evidence on these borrowing preferences. This perspective on borrowing
decisions derived from the community can be used as one of the dimensions in credit risk evaluation and in
policy formulation.
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1 Introduction
In a society, reciprocity behaviour among members help individuals achieve social and economic objectives.
Rational individuals in communities strategically become part of social network to reap the benefits by being a
part of it (Jackson & Watts, 2002). Inside the network, when individuals cooperate with each other, they could
act collectively to gain economic values. The level of cooperation will depend on the level of trust among
individuals inside the network. This kind of trust in a network acts as a lubricant in economic transactions among
the members of the network (Arrow, 1974). Thus, we can argue that an individual’s pay-off to participate in the
network will be a function of an ex ante assigned belief or trust by the individual on certain actions of others
inside the network. Therefore, individuals in the network is likely to build trust over time to enjoy the benefits of
being trustworthy (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). Any loss of trustworthiness in the network will bring
disutility for the individual, as others may not cooperate with her as before.
Inside a social network, loss of trustworthiness is most likely to be reflected in frequency, and amount of
financial transactions among members of the network. In informal credit market, pledged collaterals in case of
secured credit acts as a deterrent for borrowers to default. However, in case of unsecured credit, borrower is likely
to lose non-monetary collateral in the form of social trust in the network (Karlan et al., 2009). We call this as
invisible collateral, because the trustworthiness is invisible to public in general. However, this invisible collateral
can be a deterrent for the borrower to default.
The problem with invisible collateral is that it cannot be estimated directly by the lender. Besides, existence
of invisible collateral affects the risk associated with both secured and unsecured credit. Nevertheless, invisible
collateral enables lenders to engage with borrowers because in case the borrower defaults, the loss in social trust
inside the network will result in reducing social benefits arising out of accessing credit in future (Guiso et al.,
2004). Therefore, for an individual there will be a cost of default, which can be termed as social cost of default,
which is directly proportional to loss in invisible collateral. In case social cost of default for an individual in a
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network is high then the invisible collateral for the same individual is high, hence the individual is less likely to
default and vice-versa.
In this article we provide a perspective on individuals’ social behaviour inside the network and its implications
on credit risk evaluation by the lender. We use India’s household indebtedness survey data, to argue for the
existence of invisible collateral and its linkages with social cost of default for both rural and urban areas.
2 Social Cost of Default
Social cost of default is the dis-utility of reduction of social trust for an individual in the network when the
individual defaults on a credit. Lee & Persson (2016) call this as shadow cost, which discourages credit default.
This is different from peer pressure in case of joint liability lending program. In case of joint liability lending
design, members pressurise the individual to repay back the credit, and this pressure is external in nature. In this
case the individual is paying not out of own choice, but due to peer pressure. Whereas social cost of default is
completely internal to individual, and the individual will pay back the credit even without any peer pressure when
social cost of default of the individual is very high. At the same time, an individual having very low social cost of
default (who does not care about her social reputation) will have less incentive to repay the loan.
We can argue that the social cost of default arises from two components - the stand-alone cost of default to the
individual and cost of default due to imitation effect from other members of her network. Standalone cost is the
core component, which is a function of self-respect, social prestige and this part of the cost is independent of how
other’s act in the network. Suppose an individual is endowed with high level of self-respect, then she is less likely
to default. On the other hand, social cost of default due to imitation effect will depend on action of others’ in the
network. For example, if everyone in the network is defaulting on a specific credit, then it might be less costly for
any individual to default in that network. Similarly, if others in the same network does not default, then social
cost of default for any individual would be higher in that network. Therefore, while evaluating credit risk of an
individual it will be prudent to also evaluate the behaviour of the community to which the individual belongs.
Thus, if the social cost of default is visible, then a lender would use it for credit risk evaluation as well as credit
allocation. However, this cost is completely invisible, but sometimes borrower can signal it through their actions
like lender selection. For example, when an individual plan to invest in a risky project, she will prefer to borrow
from a lender who is relatively separated from her network (Bygrave & Hunt, 2005). Similarly, Galland (2006)
finds, borrowing from family and close relatives becomes last resort despite zero cost of borrowing. Gue´rin et al.
(2012) finds, discomfort of Indians’ while borrowing from family members and close relatives, because they feel
they may lose social insurance in case of default. In next section we provide some evidence from India on how
individuals incorporate their social cost of default while borrowing by using the “National Sample Survey (NSS)
70th Round Households Indebtedness Survey” data (released in 2013 by Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation).
3 Evidence from India’s Household Indebtedness Survey
The “NSS 70th Round Households Indebtedness Survey data” consists of data from both rural and urban areas of
India that covers both institutional and non-institutional lenders. Institutional lenders consist of banks, insurance
companies, provident fund houses, financial institutions (including financial corporations and companies),
SHG-bank linked banks and NBFCs, and other institutional agencies. On the other hand, non-institutional
lenders consist of landlords, agricultural and professional money lenders, input suppliers, doctors, lawyers, other
professionals, and relatives and friends. For our purpose, we have reported number of individuals out of 1000
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Table 1: Borrowing from Relatives and Friends - Profession Wise
Per 1000 households report cash loan outstanding
Borrowing Sources Rural Urban
Cultivator Non-cultivator All Self-employed Others All
Institutional 208 112 172 159 143 148
Non-institutional 200 175 190 122 94 103
of which relatives and friends 67 55 63 49 39 42
Total 408 287 362 281 237 251
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 16.42 19.16 17.40 17.44 16.46 16.73
Cash loan (in rupees) per Rs. 1000 of total cash loan outstanding
Borrowing Sources Rural Urban
Cultivator Non-cultivator All Self-employed Others All
Institutional 584 493 560 791 878 845
Non-institutional 416 507 440 209 122 155
of which relatives and friends 77 90 80 54 34 42
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 7.70 9.00 8.00 5.40 3.40 4.20
Source: All-India Debt and Investment Surveys (AlDIS) of the National Sample Survey (NSS).
households (as reported in survey) who borrow from different sources. Our focus on how individuals do financial
transactions with families and friends.
The Table 1 reports the data for our argument. It is observed that, in rural areas, on an average 362 (out of
1000) are indebted, and 17.4 percent of those depends on friends and relatives for their funding need. Similarly,
in urban areas 251 (out of 1000) are indebted and 16.73 percent of them borrowed from relatives and friends.
Cultivators rely less on friends and relatives than non-cultivators in rural areas. On the other hand, self-employed
rely more on relatives and friends in comparison to others in urban areas. In terms of amount of borrowing 8
percentage point of the credit need is met from relative and friends in rural areas, and the same is 4.2 percentage
point in case of urban areas. Non-cultivators borrow relatively higher amounts from relatives and friends in rural
areas, while the same is true for self-employed in urban areas. One can argue that amount borrowed from relatives
and friends depends upon the availability of funds with them. Therefore, the number of cases borrowing from
relatives and friends will be a better indicator of financial dependency on relatives and friends than the amount of
borrowing. At the same time, availability financial institutions will also affect the amount of borrowing from
relative and friends, which explains the significant differences between urban and rural areas with respect to the
amount of borrowing from relatives and friends.
Dependency of cultivators and self-employed on relatives and friends for their credit needs is significantly low
(Table 1). These livelihood activities are risky in nature, which is known to the individual borrower. Therefore,
when an individual is knowingly borrowing for risky project, she would not like to spoil her reputation in the
network because the social cost of default in the network is high. Hence, it can be argued that when an individual
needs credit to invest in risky activities, it is prudent to look outside the network. This argument is even clearer
when we look at the data (Table 2). The table represent the loan numbers as well as loan amount by ranges of
interest rates 1 . We can see that borrowing from relatives and friends happen at zero cost. Despite the cost of
borrowing being zero, only 10.48 (9.65 percentage point of number of loans) percentage point of loan amount is
availed from relatives and friends in rural areas. The percentage points are similar for urban areas as well. This
evidence supports the argument found in the literature, namely that, individuals keep family members, relatives,
and close friends as lenders of last resort (Galland, 2006; Gue´rin et al., 2012). We are attributing these Indian
1In each interest rate range, the distribution of loans are given out of Rs. 1000. For nine interest rate ranges, total amount of loan in all
interest rate range is 9000. Therefore, proportion of loan in a particular interest range and source is calculated out of Rs.9000
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Table 2: Borrowing from Relatives and Friends over Interest Rate Ranges
Interest Rate (in percent)
Borrowing Sources 0 0 to 6 6 to 10 10 to 12 12 to 15 15 to 20 20 to 25 25 to 30 more than 30
Cash loan (in rupees) per Rs. 1000 of total cash loan outstanding for different interest rate
Rural Institutional 55 798 988 960 929 623 73 209 36
Non-institutional 945 202 12 40 71 377 927 791 964
of which relatives and friends 943 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Total Amount 9000
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 10.48
Urban Institutional 67 883 989 995 960 887 195 761 64
Non-institutional 933 117 11 5 40 113 805 239 936
of which relatives and friends 933 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Total Amount 9000
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 10.37
Per 1000 households report cash loan outstanding for different interest rate
Rural Institutional 23 463 610 583 587 413 85 136 22
Non-institutional 506 113 9 65 31 198 490 335 574
of which relatives and friends 506 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 529 576 619 648 618 611 575 471 596
Total Number of Cases 5243
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 9.65
Urban Institutional 27 514 674 710 592 460 133 328 38
Non-institutional 501 99 27 28 52 117 413 140 532
of which relatives and friends 501 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 528 613 701 738 644 577 546 468 570
Total Number of Cases 5385
Relatives and friends share (in percent) 9.30
Source: All-India Debt and Investment Surveys (AlDIS) of the National Sample Survey (NSS).
borrowers’ behaviour to existence of invisible collateral in the network in the form of social cost of default.
4 Role of Invisible Collateral – Benefits to the Lenders
As discussed earlier, imitation effect has an impact on social cost of default. Higher the imitation effect for default,
lesser the social cost of default, hence higher the credit risk. Therefore, if lenders can observe the prevalence of
higher default rate for a group of borrowers, then an individual in that group is more likely to have less social cost
of default and higher credit risk. Therefore, it is beneficial for the lenders to take this behavioural phenomenon
into account while providing credit. In this way, this invisible collateral can be helpful for lenders. This kind of
strategic credit allocation is visible in bank lending to self-help groups. To see these linkages, we divided the
NSS data into six different regions (central, northern, north eastern, eastern, western, southern) as prescribed by
“Status of Microfinance in India 2017-18, NABARD” report. The rationale behind this classification is to make it
compatible with the non-performing assets (NPAs) of self-help groups for different regions as reported in the
“Status of Microfinance in India 2017-18, NABARD”. If we assume that SHGs are like network of borrowers
with in a cluster (regions), we can infer some linkages between social cost of default (existence of invisible
collateral) and default rate. Our hypothesis is that we should see different level of dependency on relatives and
friends on credit needs across these clusters (regions) and higher the dependency on relatives and friends, higher
will be the default rate. The cluster (regions) wise data is reported in Figure 1. It can be observed that, individuals
in southern region has the least dependence on relatives and friends for their credit need. At the same time,
individuals in northern region has the highest dependence on relatives and friends for their credit need. According
to literature and our arguments above, individuals in southern regions are expected to have higher social cost of
default relative to other regions.
A simple linear regression with credit dependency on friends and relatives has been carried out for region
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Figure 1: Borrowing from Relatives and Friends
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Note: Graph plots average number of cases that report the borrowing from relatives and friends to total number of cases of states in in
each region.
Source: All-India Debt and Investment Surveys (AlDIS) of the National Sample Survey (NSS).
dummies to examine the statistical difference across regions in India. Table 3 reports the results of this regression
showing southern region has significantly lower dependency on relatives and friends compared to other regions.
Also, the F-test of the overall regression is significant and confirms to regional variations of financial dependency
on relatives and friends in India. Evidence of lower dependency on relatives and friends in the southern region
may be due to higher penetration of self-help groups (SHGs) in the region. Therefore it might be difficult to
separate out the impacts of social cost of default and SHGs penetrations. However, if social cost of default is
higher in southern region, then expected credit default is relatively likely to be lower in southern regions. To see
this, we present a scatter plot of percentage point of non-performing assets (NPAs) of self-help groups (SHGs)
and loans per SHG (in lakhs) sourced from Status of Microfinance in India 2017 – 2018 (Published by National
Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD)) in Figure 2. It can be observed that there exists a
clustering among different regions. For example, southern region shows low NPAs and high loans per SHG,
while the inverse is true for central, northern, and north eastern regions. This clear negative linear association
between these variables is suggestive of the credit allocation strategy by banks.
SHGs are mostly based in rural areas and are highly immobile, and the members with in a SHG possess high
social connectivity with each other. Besides, majority of members interact on daily basis which leads to high
degree of information spill over. Therefore, social cost of default (existence of invisible collateral) for individuals
are expected to be high. Thus, our argument, higher social cost of default leading to both low dependence on
close relatives and friends, as well as low credit risk is supported by this evidence presented above. Therefore,
banks should consider evaluating the presence of invisible collateral to make better credit decision. However,
gathering this soft information is costly, but it is useful in evaluating credit risk from the context of borrower’s
community.
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Table 3: Regression Results
(1)
Region Dummies Rural Dependence on Relatives and Friends
Eastern Region -0.919
(9.833)
North Eastern Region -9.782
(7.527)
Northern Region 2.598
(10.59)
Southern Region -16.08∗
(7.438)
Western Region -5.220
(8.708)
Constant 27.45∗∗∗
(6.873)
Observations 29
Prob > F 0.07
R-Square 0.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5 Conclusion
Fear of losing social trust incentivises borrowers to repay the credit irrespective of whether it is secured or
unsecured. This invisible collateral for an individual can be used to reduce credit risk for the lender. Our analysis
of existing Indian data shows some evidence of individuals signalling through not being dependent on individuals
from their close network for funds despite the cost of borrowing being zero. The invisible collateral being a
non-monetary cost derived from community can be helpful in designing policies like credit guarantee schemes.
Moreover, imitation effect among individuals to default jointly affects this cost, leading to higher credit risk or
NPAs. This information from the network should be considered while allocating credit. Therefore, borrower’s
social status such as strong ties, interconnectedness, network she belongs to etc. are important dimensions that
should be used while individuals are involved in informal credit contracts.
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